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Abstract
For many Internet applications, the ability to protect the
identity of participants in a distributed applications is criti-
cal. For suchapplications,anumberof anonymouscommu-
nication systems have been realized over the recent years.
The effectiveness of these systems relies greatly on the way
messages are routed among the participants. (We call this
the route selection strategy.) In this paper, we describe how
to select routes so as to maximize the ability of the anony-
mouscommunicationsystems toprotectanonymity. Tomea-
sure this ability, we deﬁnea metric (anonymitydegree),and
we design and evaluate an optimal route selection strategy
that maximizes the anonymity degree of a system. Our ana-
lytical and experimental data shows that the anonymity de-
gree may not always monotonically increase as the length
of communication paths increase. We also found that vari-
able path-length strategies perform better than ﬁxed-length
strategies.
1 Introduction
This paper addresses issues related to design and imple-
mentation of an optimal strategy for anonymous commu-
nications. This optimal strategy is based on a quantitative
analysis of the behavior of the anonymous communication
systems.
With the rapidgrowthandpublicacceptanceof the Inter-
net as a means of communication and information dissemi-
nation, concerns about privacy and security on the Internet
have grown. Anonymity becomes a essential requirement
for many on-line Internet applications, such as E-Voting, E-
Banking, E-Commerce, and E-Auctions. Anonymity pro-
tects the identity of a participant in a networked applica-
tion. Many anonymous communication systems have been
developed, which protect the identity of the participants in
variousforms: sender anonymityprotects the identity of the
sender, while receiver anonymity does this for the receiver.
Mutual anonymity guarantees that both parties of a commu-
nication remain anonymous to each other.
Among these various forms of anonymity, sender
anonymity is most critical in many current Internet appli-
cations. In E-Voting, for example, a cast vote should not be
traceable back to the voter. Similarly, users may generally
not want to disclose their identities when visiting web sites.
In this paper, we will therefore focus primarily on sender
anonymity.
Sender anonymity is most commonly achieved by trans-
mitting a message to its destination through one or more
intermediate nodes in order to hide the true identity of the
sender. The message thus is effectively rerouted along what
is called a rerouting path. In this paper, we study rerouting-
based anonymous communication systems in terms of their
ability to protect sender anonymity. The selection of rerout-
ing paths is critical for this kind of systems. We study how
differentpathselection strategiesaffect the abilityto protect
sender anonymity. For a given anonymous communication
system, we measure this ability by determining how much
uncertainty this system can provide to hide the true identity
of a sender. We call this measure the anonymity degree.
In our investigation, we assume a passive adversary
model: The adversary can compromise one or more nodes
in the system. An adversary agent at such a compromised
node can gather information about messages that traverse
the node. If the compromised node is involved in the mes-
sagererouting,it candiscoverandreportthe immediatepre-
decessor and successor node for each message traversing
the compromised node. We assume that the adversary col-
lects all the informationfrom its agents at the compromised
nodes and attempts to derive the identity of the sender of a
message.
In the following sections, we will elaborate on two ob-
servations that we made based on a quantitative analysis of
the anonymity degree of systems.
￿ Commonsense indicates that the anonymitydegreein-
creases with increasing number of intermediate nodes
between the sender and the receiver. (We call this
number of intermediate nodes the path length of the
rerouting path.) There is a point, however, beyond
whichincreasingthepathlengthactuallydecreasesthe
anonymitydegree. We will give a quantitativeanalysis
of how path length affects the anonymity degree.￿ Rerouting schemes give rise to either paths with ﬁxed
length (where messages are forwarded to the receiver
after traversing a ﬁxed number of intermediate nodes)
or variable length (whereevery intermediatenode ran-
domly decides whether to forward the message to the
receiver directly or to another intermediate node, for
example.). We will show that variable path length
strategies perform better than ﬁxed path length strate-
gies in term of anonymity degree. However, when the
expected path length is sufﬁciently large, the differ-
ence of anonymity degree is relatively small between
different variable and ﬁxed path length strategies.
As a result of this study, we found that several well-
known anonymous communication systems are not using
the best path selection strategies. We therefore believe that
our results are greatly helpful for the current and future de-
velopmentof anonymouscommunicationsystems. We pro-
poseanoptimalmethodtoselectpathlengths. Wewillshow
that path selection problem can be cast as an optimization
problem, whose solution yields an optimal path length dis-
tribution that maximizes the anonymity degree.
The remainderof this paperis organizedas follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives an overview of the previous work on anony-
mous communication systems. In Section 3, we present the
system model and discuss the key issues in path selection in
such systems. In Section 4, we describe the threat model.
In Section 5, we deﬁne a security metric, called anonymity
degree, to evaluate the anonymity behavior of anonymous
communication systems. In Section 6, we report our nu-
merical results. Finally, in Section 7, we present our con-
clusions.
2 Overview of Anonymous Communication
Systems
In this section, we survey the past work related to
anonymity, including DC-Net [4, 22], Mixes [3, 10, 11],
Anonymizer [1], Anonymous Remailer [2], LPWA [6],
Onion Routing [8, 17, 19, 20], Crowds [14], Hordes [15],
Freedom [7], and PipeNet [5].
Many existing anonymous communication systems pro-
videvarious formsof anonymity,such as sender anonymity,
receiver anonymity, and mutual anonymity,unlinkability of
sender and receiver,or combinationsthereof. As mentioned
in Section 1, sender anonymity is typically most in demand
for current Internet applications.
Systems that provide sender anonymity can be catego-
rized into two classes: rerouting-based systems and non-
rerouting-based systems. To the best of our knowledge,
DC-Net [4] is the only non-rerouting-based anonymous
communication system. In DC-Net, each participant shares
secret coin ﬂips with other pairs and announces the parity
of the observed ﬂips to all other participants and to the re-
ceiver. The total parity should be even, since each ﬂip is an-
nounced twice. By incorrectly stating the parity the sender
has seen, this causes the total parity to be odd. Thus the
sender can send a message to the receiver. The receiver gets
the message if it ﬁnds that the total parity is odd. Nobody
except the sender herself knows who sent it. The advantage
of DC-Net over rerouting-based systems is that it does not
introduce extra overhead in term of longer rerouting delays
and extra amount of rerouting trafﬁc. It relies, however, on
an underlying broadcast medium, which comes at great ex-
pense as the number of participants increases. Due to this
lack of scalability in practice, none of the current on-line
applications employs this method. In the remainder of this
paper, we will therefore focus on rerouting-basedsystems.
Most widely-used anonymous communication systems
reroute messages through a series of intermediate nodes:
The sender sends the message to such an intermediate node
ﬁrst. This node then forwards the message either to the re-
ceiver,ortoanotherintermediatenode,whichthenforwards
the message again. Once the message traverses the ﬁrst
intermediate node, the sender cannot be identiﬁed solely
based on the information kept in the header of the mes-
sage alone. Even though rerouting introduces extra delay
and typically increases the amount of trafﬁc due to longer
routes, this approach is scalable and practical when such
overheads are within tolerable limits. In the following, we
will brieﬂy overview a number of such communicationsys-
tems. They differ from each other mainly by the way the
reroutingpathisselected. We willthereforecategorizethem
according to their path selection strategies.
Anonymizer [1] provides fast, anonymous, interactive
communication services. Anonymizer in this approach is
essentially a web proxy that ﬁlters out the identifying head-
ers and source addresses from web client requests. Instead
of a user’s true identity, a web server can only learn the
identity of the Anonymizer Server. In this approach, all
rerouting paths have a single intermediate node, which is
the Anonymizer Server. Similar to Anonymizer, Lucent
Personalized Web Assistant [6] also uses the rerouting path
with only one intermediate node.
Anonymous Remailer [2] is mainly used for email
anonymity. It employs rerouting of an email through a se-
quence of mail remailers and then to the recipient such that
the true origin of the email can be hidden.
Onion-routing [8, 17, 20, 19] provides anonymousInter-
net connection services. It builds a rerouting path within a
network of onion routers, which in turn are similar to real-
time Chaum Mixes [3]. A Mix is a store-and-forwarddevice
that accepts a number of ﬁxed-length messages from dif-
ferent sources, discards repeats, performs a cryptographic
transformation on the messages, and then outputs the mes-
sage to the next destination in an order not predictable from
the order of inputs. A Mix based approach then sends mes-
sages over a series of independent such mixes.
Onion Routing I [17, 20, 19] uses a network of ﬁve
Onion Routing nodes operating at the Naval Research Lab-
oratory. It forces a ﬁxed length (ﬁve hops) for all routes.
Onion Routing II [19] can support a network of up to50 core Onion Routers. For each rerouting path through
an onion routing network, each hop is chosen at random.
Rerouting paths may contain cycles. The path selection
approach is borrowed from Crowds [14], and the expected
route length is completely determined by the weight of ﬂip-
ping a coin.
Crowds [14] aims at protecting the users’ web-browsing
anonymity. Like Onion Routing, the Crowds protocol uses
a series of cooperating proxies (called jondos) to maintain
anonymity within the group. Unlike Onion Routing, the
sender does not determine the entire path. Instead, the path
is chosen randomly on a hop-by-hop basis. Cycles are al-
lowed on the path. Once a path is chosen, it is used for
all the anonymous communication from the sender to the
receiver within a 24-hour period. At some speciﬁc time in-
stant, new members can join the crowd and new paths can
be formed.
Freedom Network [7] also aims at providing anonymity
for web browsing. Freedom is similar to Onion Routing. It
consists of a set of proxies that run on top of the existing
Internet infrastructure. To communicate with a web server,
the user ﬁrst selects a sequence of proxies to form a rerout-
ing path, and then uses this path to forward the requests to
its destination. The Freedom Route Creation Protocol al-
lows the sender to randomly choose the path, but the path
length is ﬁxed at three intermediate nodes [21]. The Free-
dom client user interface does not allow the user to specify
a path containing cycles.
Hordes [15] employs multiple jondos similar to those
used in the Crowds protocol to anonymouslyroute a packet
towards the receiver. It uses multicast services, however, to
anonymously route the reply back to the sender instead of
using the reverse path of the request. Similar to Crowds,
Hordes also allows cycles on the forwarding path.
PipeNet [5] is a simple anonymous protocol. It is based
on the idea of virtual link encryption. Before the sender
starts to send the data, it establishes a rerouting path.
PipeNetalways generatesa reroutingpathwith threeorfour
intermediate nodes.
3 System Model and Path Selection
The system model used in the following discussion is an
abstraction of the systems mentioned above. It will there-
forelenditselfwelltodiscussingthekeyissuesinrerouting-
based anonymous communication systems.
3.1 System Model
A rerouting-based anonymous communication system
consists of a set of
￿ nodes
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collaborate with each other to achieve anonymity. Follow-
ing general practice, we assume that the receiver
￿ is al-
ways compromised and we therefore do not include it to be
part of the
￿ nodes. For our purposes, we model the net-
work at the transport layer and assume that every host can
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Figure 1. System Model
communicate with every other host. The network therefore
canbemodeledas a clique. Anedgein thisgraphrepresents
adirectpath(i.e.,with nointermediatenodes)froma source
host to a destination host (possibly through some routers in
the network). To hide the true identity of the sender, the
message is transmitted from source to destination through
one or more intermediate nodes. We call the path traversed
by the message, rerouting path, describe it as follows:
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Figure 1 shows a system of 16 nodes, and Node
￿ is the
sender of a message. The message is transmitted along the
rerouting path
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￿ determined by the
anonymous communication system, and ﬁnally arrives at
Node
￿ . In this example, the message has traversed 5 inter-
mediate nodes. We deﬁne the path length to be the number
of intermediate nodes on the path, and we thereforesay that
the path length is 5 in this case.
3.2 Path Selection
Either before or during the transmission of a mes-
sage, the rerouting-based anonymous communication sys-
tem must construct a rerouting path from the source to the
destination. Figure 2 shows a framework for how this can
be done. (The steps in Figure 2 are often made only implic-
itly in real systems. For example, the protocol may impose
a path length of a given ﬁxed size, and a limited number
of rerouting nodes may make a selection of a rerouting se-
quence irrelevant.)
INPUT:
￿ ,
￿ : source and destination of a message
1. Select path length
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Figure 2. Rerouting Path Selection Algorithm
From Figure 2, it is clear that the key steps in path se-
lection are (1) to choose the length of the rerouting path(path length) and (2) to choose the sequence of intermedi-
ate nodes on the path.
There are two kinds of strategies that can be used: ﬁxed
length and variable length. In the case of variable length,
thepathlengthisarandomvariableconformingtoaspeciﬁc
probability distribution. Onion-Routing I and Freedom use
ﬁxed-lengthstrategies, whereasCrowdsandOnion-Routing
II use variable-length strategies.
It is up to the system developerto decide the type of path
lengthselection(ﬁxedorvariable)andits parameters. Since
the ﬁxed-lengthstrategycan be regardedas a special case of
variable-length strategy, we will focus on the variable path
length case in the remainder of this paper.
Oncethe pathlengthis deﬁned,thereroutingpathis cho-
sen by randomly selecting intermediate nodes. Depending
on whether a node can be chosen on a rerouting path more
than once, we classify paths either as simple paths (no cycle
isallowed)orcomplicatedpaths(cyclesareallowed). Com-
paringto pathlengthselection, choosingintermediatenodes
is rather straightforward when the underlying topology is a
clique. So in this paper, we will focus on path lengths. In
particular, we study path length distributions that maximize
the degree of anonymity of these systems.
4 Threat Model
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne the adversary’s capabili-
ties in terms of a threat model. We then describe how the
adversary can take advantage of these capabilities to moni-
tor the network activities, and use the collected information
to derive the probability that each node is the sender of a
message.
In this paper,we considera passive adversarymodel: By
passively monitoringmessages in transit, the adversary col-
lects information and derives the probability that a node in
the system can be identiﬁed as the sender of a message. In
order to have access to messages, the adversary has previ-
ously compromised a number of nodes. We assume that an
anonymous communication system consists of
￿ nodes, of
which
￿ are compromised
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We assume that the receiver is compromised as well1. An
agent of the adversary at a compromisednode observes and
collectsalltheinformationinthemessageandso reportsthe
immediate predecessor and successor node for each mes-
sage traversing the compromised node. We assume that
the adversary collects this informationfrom all the compro-
mised nodes and uses it to derive the probability that each
node can be identiﬁed as the true sender.
Our analysisis basedon theworst case assumptionin the
following sense:
￿ The senderhas noinformationabout numberand iden-
tities of compromised nodes. The route selection
1This assumption proves true in many realistic situations: For example,
an email author may want to hide its identity from the recipient. Similarly,
a visitor to a web page may want to hide its identity from the web server.
therefore does not rely on knowledge about which
nodes are compromised. Thus, some compromised
nodes may be on the rerouting path.
￿ The adversary has full knowledge of the path selection
algorithm. In particular, the adversary knows the path
length distribution.
￿ To simplify our discussion, without loss of much gen-
erality, we assume that messages that traverse these
compromised nodes on the path can be correlated.
That is, a message
￿ received by a compromised node
can be determined whether it is same as the one
￿
￿
received by another compromised node on the path
at an earlier time. For some anonymous communi-
cation systems, for example, Crowds, this is possible
by comparing the payload no matter whether it is en-
cryptedor not. Formorecomplicatecases in whichthe
messages can not be deﬁnitely correlated, for exam-
ple, Onion-Routing and other MIX-type systems, we
believe that correlation between messages (e.g., prob-
ability that messages
￿ and
￿
￿
are the same one) can
be analyzed even if messages can not be completely
correlated. We will leave it as our future work.
In previous studies of anonymous communication sys-
tems, various attack models were assumed [14, 15, 19]. As
it turns out, many of these models are special cases of our
model described above. For example:
￿ Attack by observing respondent [15] and end server
[14]: These two cases correspond to the case in our
model where the receiver is compromised.
￿ Attack by active and passive path traceback [15] and
collaborating jondos [14]: These two examples corre-
spondtothecaseinourmodelwherethereroutingpath
can be reconstructed by the attacker using the routing
information or other monitoring information from at
least
￿
￿
6
￿ nodes on the reroutingpath compromised(
(
is the path length).
￿ Attack by local eavesdropper [14, 15]: This corre-
sponds to the case in our model that the sender of the
message is compromised.
First of all, the adversary collects the information about
the path selection algorithm and its parameters, and all the
information about network activities from those compro-
mised nodes. The information collected by the adversary
can be classiﬁed into two types: static (off-line) informa-
tion and dynamic (on-line) information. Static information
includes the knowledge about the path selection algorithm
and its parameters, especially the path length distribution.
Dynamic information is collected at run-time and is based
on network activities, e.g., when and where messages come
from and go to.Dynamic information is collected by the compromised
nodes in the system as follows: every compromised node
on the path, say Node
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compromised nodes that are not on the path implicitly re-
port that they saw no message. After collecting informa-
tion from all compromised nodes, the adversary can sort
these tuples collected by time
￿
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￿
￿ in ascending order. As-
sume the ordered tuples are
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denote these collected tuples as
￿ , which is the information
the adversary collects by observing the system.
Followingthis, theadversaryattempts toderivethe prob-
ability that each node in the system is the true sender, i.e.,
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where
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￿ represents the event that the information col-
lected by the adversary is
￿ .
How to calculate
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￿ can be foundin [9].
5 Measurement and Optimization of
Anonymity Degree
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne a metric, anonymity de-
gree, to evaluate the ability of anonymous communication
systems to protect the identity of a sender. We then de-
scribe how to compute the anonymity degree of a system
and present the analytical results for a number of special
cases. Based on these, we formalize an optimization prob-
lem to determine a path length distribution that maximizes
the anonymity degree of a system.
5.1 Anonymity Degree
For each node
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indicates how likely Node
￿ can be identiﬁed as the true
sender given that the adversary has collected information
￿
(i.e., the tuple sequence given in Section 4).
We assume that, from the adversary’s perspective, all
nodeshave the same a priori probabilityof beingthe sender
before the collected information can be evaluated. With the
additionalcollected information
￿ , the adversarycan derive
a more accurate a posteriori probability that nodes can be
the true sender.
To evaluate the overall average uncertainty of each node
being the true sender given the additional collected infor-
mation
￿ , we need to deﬁne a single value measure on
the anonymity that a system can provide. Following Shan-
non’s measure of information, we can deﬁne the entropy
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) gives a precise measurement on the
anonymity. When
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) is larger, there is greater
uncertainty about which of the nodes is the true sender. It
has the upper bound
;
<
=
6
￿ , which corresponds to the case
that there is no compromised node in the system and thus
the adversary has no knowledge about what is going on in
the system (i.e., each node has equal probability
￿
> of being
the sender). On the other hand,
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) has lower
bound
￿ , which means that some node in the system has
been identiﬁed as the true sender.
By now, considering a given event
￿ (Here, event is a
set of experiments whose outcomes (i.e., paths created by
the sender) conform to collected information
￿ .), one can
use
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) to measure the average uncertainty that
each node in the system can be identiﬁed as the true sender.
For an anonymous communication systems, there might be
multiple different events the adversary may observe.
Considering all the possible events, we deﬁne the
anonymity degree
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and
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) is calculated in Formula (4). Here we
assume that the variable path length conforms to the prob-
ability distribution
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The anonymity degree
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represents the overall average anonymity in the system and
will be used as a system security metric in the following.
5.2 Computation of Anonymity Degree
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From the deﬁnition of anonymity degree in Formula 5,
we have to calculate
￿
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Q
￿
￿
) and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
5
￿
Q
￿
￿
￿ for
each event
￿
￿
 
￿
R . Here
R is the set of all possible events
the adversary may observe.
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The derivation of
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￿ can be
found in [9].
5.3 Analytical Result for Special Cases
In Section 5.2, we have derived the general results for
computing anonymity degree. Here, we analyze three spe-
cial cases that allow for closed-form formulas. While these
special cases are simple, the closed-formformulas will help
us to analytically verify a number of properties that we ob-
serve in the numerical analysis presented in Section 6.
In the ﬁrst special case, we consider a system using
a ﬁxed-length simple path with exactly one compromised
node. As discussed in Section 3, we know that
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% .
The anonymity degree
￿
2
@
#
￿
*
) achieved by this system can
be easily determined as follows:
Theorem 1 For a system having exactly one compromised
node and using a ﬁxed-length simple path, when
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Inthesecondspecialcase,weconsiderasystemthatuses
variable-length paths conforming to the following distribu-
tion:
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In this case, the following theorem can be obtained.
Theorem 2 For a system that uses variable-length paths
with a length distribution conforming to (12), we have
 
A
!
#
￿
(
￿
&
!
￿
)
￿
0
1
(
!
￿
)
￿
0
!
￿
)
-
(
1
)
￿
(
W
!
)
-
4
5
6
7
-
%
!
￿
)
-
(
4
5
6
7
!
1
)
0
)
￿
￿
)
-
(
(
8
(13)
When the path length conforms to the uniform distribu-
tion over the interval
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Theorem 3 The anonymity degree of a system with a uni-
form path length distribution over the interval
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We note that the anonymity degree only depends on the ex-
pected value of the path length.
The proofs of the above three theorems can be found in
[9].
5.4 Optimization of Anonymity Degree
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It is clear that
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) is a function of the path length
distribution
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
M
￿ . The goal of this study is to derive
an optimal path length distribution that can maximize the
anonymity degree of a system. This can be formalized as
the following optimization problem:
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By solving this optimization problem, we can determine a
path length distribution that maximizes the anonymity de-
gree
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*
) .
6 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we focus on analyzing how different path
length distributions impact the value of the anonymity de-
gree
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) is numerically computed for systems
with different path selection strategies.
Throughout this section, we use
￿ for the number of
nodes and
￿ for the number of compromised nodes in the
system. We denote by
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M
) the ﬁxed-length path selection
strategy with paths of ﬁxed length
M , whereas
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) is for
strategy using paths of variable length that are uniformly
distributed over the interval
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) , respectively.
6.1 EffectofPathLengthforCaseofFixedLength
Paths
First we study the anonymity degree of a system using
ﬁxed length paths. Figure 3 (a) shows how the anonymity
degree of the system changes as the path length increases.
Figure 3 (b) is a magniﬁed representation of Figure 3 (a)
when
%
￿
￿
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￿
￿
￿
￿ .
We have the following observations from Figure 3 (a):6.48
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Figure 3. Anonymity Degree vs. Path Length. (
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) increases as
the path length increases. This coincides with general
intuition: the more a message is rerouted, the more
difﬁcult it is for the adversary to infer the sender.
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) is not always monotonically increas-
ing as the path length increases. For a system with
100 nodes and 1 compromised node,
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its maximum value when path length
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) becomes a decreasing function. We
call this long path effect. This observation is against
intuition. One would expect that anonymity would be
better with longer paths. Our results show that this is
NOT always true. This phenomenon can actually be
explained: As the path length increases, the possibil-
ity that compromised nodes are on the path increases
too. So the adversary would gain better information
about the path and his chance to identify the sender is
improved. This explains why
￿
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) becomes an de-
creasing function when
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% .
Figure 3 (b) shows, when
M
￿
￿
, the anonymity degree
of the system has a special varying trend. We call this phe-
nomenon short path effect. Short path (
M
￿
￿
￿
) increases the
chance that the adversary identiﬁes the sender. However,
this is NOT always true. From Figure 3 (b), we have the
following observations:
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.
This coincides with general intuition: Length
￿ intro-
ducesmoreuncertaintyforthe caseswhenthecompro-
mised node is the ﬁrst or second intermediate node on
the path. The adversary can not know exactly where
the compromised node is on the path.
￿ For ﬁxed path length
% and
2 , the anonymity degree
are identical. Althoughthis contradictsintuition, it can
be explained: The main reason for this is that, for both
casesof
M
￿
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% and
M
￿
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2 , theadversarycaneitherknow
which node is the true sender for sure or know which
two nodes can not be the true sender and the nodes
other than these two nodes have the same probability
ofbeingidentiﬁedasthetruesender. Thisleadstoboth
path lengths having the same anonymity degree.
￿ When the path length
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￿
, the anonymity degree is
worse than that when
M
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% or
2 . This can be roughly
explained by the fact that, when
M
*
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, there are more
chances that the adversary completely identiﬁes the
sender where the receiver and the compromised node
cooperate.
Figure 3 (b) does not show
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￿
￿ , sincea systemforwardingthemessagefromthe
sender directly to the receiver can not have any anonymity,
i.e., the sender is exposed to the receiver.
We conclude that, for ﬁxed path length strategy, because
of short path effect, the anonymity degree is poor when the
path is short. As the path length increases, the adversary
has less chance to completely identify the sender and the
anonymity degree increases. But because of long path ef-
fect, the anonymity degree becomes worse again when the
path is too long. For some length, the anonymity degree
achieves its optimal value.
6.2 Effect of Path Length Expectation for Case of
Variable Length Paths
Figure4 showshowthe expectedvalueof thepathlength
impacts the anonymity degree for the case of variable path
lengths. We use the uniform distribution
:
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) as the
path length distribution, where
N is the lower bound of path
length and
( is the difference between the shortest path and
longest path. For a ﬁxed
N and a varying
( , the value for
the anonymity degree describes a curve. Selecting different
values for
N , we get a group of curves. Then we can com-
pare the anonymity degree for the same
( . Here
( is an
indication of the variance of the uniform distribution.
The four ﬁgures in Figure 4 express different meanings:
(a) For small values of
N , the anonymity degree increases
as the expected value of path length increases. For the
same variance (same
( ) of different uniform distribu-
tion (different
N ’s), the one with bigger expected value6.500
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Figure 4. Anonymity Degree vs. Expectation of Path Length with the Same Path Length Variance.
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of path length (bigger
N ) has bigger anonymity degree.
(Figure 4(a))
(b) For an intermediate value of
N , the anonymity degree
has an extreme point. (Figure 4(b))
(c) For large values of
N (
N
￿
5
1
% ), the anonymity de-
gree decreases as the expected value of path length
increases. This corresponds to the long path effect
in ﬁxed length path selection strategy. For the same
variance of different uniform distributions, the one
with bigger expected value of path length has smaller
anonymity degree. (Figure 4(c))
(d) This corresponds to the short path effect in ﬁxed
length path selection strategy. We can see for the sys-
tem using distribution
:
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*
) , due to the use of
￿ -
length path, the anonymity degree is bad when
( is
small. When
( is big, the anonymity degree of the
system using distribution
:
&
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￿
￿
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￿
) gets best anonymity
degree. This is partly because of long path effect. That
is, with large
( , the system using path length distribu-
tion other than
:
&
#
￿
￿
(
*
) has more long paths. (Figure
4(d))
6.3 Effect of Path Length Variance for Case of
Variable Length Paths
In the following, we show how the variance of path
length impacts the anonymity degree. Figure 5 shows the
anonymity degree under different path length distributions
with the same expected path length.
As Formula (14) suggests, Figure 5(a),(b) and (c) show
a group of overlayed curves when the uniform distribution
lower bound
N
/
￿
￿
. These ﬁgures show that for a sys-
tem with onecompromisednode,the expectedvalueof path
lengthofthe uniformdistributiondeterminesthe anonymity
degree. So in this case to reduce the implementation over-
head,wecanjustusetheﬁxedlengthpathselectionstrategy.
Figure 5(d) shows
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This is partly because when the expected value of path
length is small, the variance plays a more important role on
the anonymitydegreefor differentpath length distributions.
6.4 Optimal Path Length Distribution
For a given expected path length
M , the uniform distri-
bution is described as
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Figure 5. Anonymity Degree vs. Variance of Path Length with the Same Expected Path Length.
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Figure 6 shows the optimization result. The data
shows when the expected path length is short, the optimal
anonymity degree can be obtained by choosing path length
distribution
:
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) , where
M the expected path length.
When the expected value of path length is large, the vari-
ance plays a more important role and
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) can
be achieved by choosing the distribution
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) .
We can see that after optimization, the path selection
strategy using the optimized path length distribution is bet-
ter than the strategy using any other uniform distribution
and ﬁxed length strategy. Moreover, for the large expected
value of path length, the optimal path length distribution
gets better anonymity degree.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we quantitatively analyze the anonymity
behavior of anonymous communication systems under dif-
ferent rerouting path selection strategies. We considered
several path selection methods used by applications and
modeled the behavior of the adversary. We measure the
system anonymity in terms of anonymity degree. Our main
results from this study are:
1. Long message rerouting path may incur worse
anonymity degree. A general intuition has been that
the longer the rerouting path, the better the system’s
anonymity. While this is true in many cases, our an-
alytical result shows that the anonymity of the sys-
tem may NOT always be improved as path length in-
creases. A longer path of rerouting may not result in abetter anonymity.
2. For a system using variable-length paths whose length
conforms to a uniform distribution, we ﬁnd that if
the lower bound of the path length is greater than or
equal to 3, the strategies using ﬁxed-length paths and
variable-length paths conforming to uniform distribu-
tion have the same anonymity degree when the path
length expectation of uniform distribution is equal to
the path length of ﬁxed-length path strategy.
3. Based on our quantitative analysis, we formalize an
optimizationproblem to derive the optimal path length
distribution that can maximize the anonymity degree
of the system. The optimal path distribution can be
computed numerically and analytically.
4. After optimization, variable-lengthpath strategies per-
form better than ﬁxed-length path strategies in term
of anonymity degree. However, no matter what path
length strategy is used, the anonymity degree of the
system is upper-bounded by
;
<
=
6
￿ , where
￿ is the
total number of nodes in the system.
Following the analytical results, we can see that several
existing anonymous communication systems are not using
the best path selection strategy and can be improved to pro-
vide higher degrees of anonymity. The results reported in
this paper will help system developers properly design path
selectionalgorithmsandconsequentlyimprovetheir anony-
mous communication systems.
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